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INTRODUCTION 
              Empirical research consistently shows that the 
two main reasons why people do not report perceived wrongdoing 
are fear of retaliation and a belief that, even if they did 
so, the matter would not be rectified.2 Thus if legislation is 
to promote whistleblowing in the public interest it should 
provide mechanisms for investigating and dealing with 
allegations of wrongdoing as well as protect those who make 
them. Although many countries go further, the sole aim of  
Part IVA of the Employment Rights Act 1996(ERA 1996)is to 
protect workers in specified circumstances. Employers are not 
obliged by this statute to have whistleblowing procedures and, 
even if they have them, there is no specific requirement to 
investigate allegations let alone deal with any proven 
                                                            
1
 The author would like to thank Estelle Feldman whose paper at the 
International Whistleblowing Research Network conference in Seattle in 
March 2012 inspired him to explore this topic further. 
2
 See Miceli, M., Near, J and Dworkin, T: Whistleblowing in 
Organizations, New York: Routledge.2008. & Brown, A. (Ed.) 2008.’  
Whistleblowing in the Australian Public Sector’. Canberra: ANU E Press  
2008.http://epress.anu.edu.au/anzsog/whistleblowing/pdf_instruction 
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wrongdoing. The same is true of regulators (prescribed persons 
under Section 43D ERA 1996), although a recipient of a concern 
may be in breach of their duty of care if they choose simply 
to disregard it.  
          This article argues that employment tribunal 
(ET)adjudication may be both a difficult and ineffective 
mechanism for resolving whistleblowing disputes and that 
alternatives need to be considered. Perhaps the most obvious 
problem is that tribunals are neither empowered to investigate 
protected disclosures nor to recommend/order rectification 
where wrongdoing is established. The author believes that, if 
disclosures of serious wrongdoing are to be encouraged, both 
the law 3 and dispute resolution mechanisms need to be 
improved. Ideally, employers should be required by statute to 
maintain whistleblowing policies and procedures which meet the 
standards laid down in the PAS Code of Practice 2008.4 Such 
procedures should provide for conciliation, mediation and 
arbitration as alternative forms of redress for those who feel 
that their disclosures have not been dealt with properly or 
have allegedly suffered retaliation.5 Recognising that a legal 
                                                            
3
 For a general critique of Part IVA ERA 1996 see: Lewis,D.“Ten years of 
public interest disclosure legislation in the UK: are whistleblowers 
adequately protected?”. (2008)Journal of Business Ethics. Vol 82. Pages 497-
507  
4
 Publicly Available Specification: Whistleblowing arrangements: Code of 
Practice. 2008 (available via British Standards Institute at 
http://shop.bsigroup.com/forms/PASs/PAS-1998/) 
5It is not unusual for employers to provide for alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) as the final stage in a range of workplace procedures and 
sometimes access to it is provided for in individual contracts of 
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obligation to have effective whistleblowing arrangements is 
unlikely to be imposed by law,it is recommended that 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms should be made 
available where whistleblowing claims are lodged with ET’s.  
         For the purposes of this article it is convenient to  
adopt the Gibbons’ report definition of ADR as: “the 
collective term used to describe ways in which parties can 
settle disputes without recourse to litigation”.6  Arbitration 
is a form of adjudication in that an impartial person 7 hears 
both sides and decides between them. However, like other types 
of ADR, it is less procedurally formal than the ET process and 
inquisitorial rather than adversarial. Thus there is no 
examination or cross –examination of witnesses, the doctrine 
of precedent does not apply and there is no right of appeal.  
             In theory, it is possible to distinguish 
conciliation from mediation but this is frequently not the 
case in practice. According to the Advisory, Conciliation and 
Arbitration Service (ACAS), a conciliator discusses the issues 
with both parties in order to help them reach a better 
understanding of each other's position and underlying 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
employment. See generally: Dickens,L. “Employment Tribunals and Alternative 
Dispute Resolution” in Dickens, L. Making employment rights effective. 
Oxford, Hart. 2012.  
6
 Better Dispute Resolution: A review of employment dispute resolution in 
Great Britain. Michael Gibbons. March 2007. Department of Trade and 
Industry. 
7
 Many organisations use arbitrators as part of their internal procedures. 
However, the fact that they are paid by the employer may be thought by some 
to affect their independence.  
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interests. He or she tries to encourage the parties in dispute 
to come to an agreement between themselves. On paper, 
mediation is slightly more interventionist in that “mediators 
ask questions that help to uncover underlying problems, assist 
the parties to understand the issues and help them to clarify 
the options for resolving their difference or dispute.” 8 
Sometimes the line between arbitration and mediation also gets 
blurred and so-called “med/arb” takes place. In this situation 
the parties agree that a mediator should determine some issues 
that are referred to him or her.9 In reality it may be sensible 
to treat all ADR processes as part of a continuum. Thus 
conciliators who see the parties struggling to reach a 
settlement may suggest the basis on which a negotiated 
agreement might be achieved. Equally, a mediator may be 
willing to arbitrate on issues that the parties want 
determined for them.(More details about how ADR mechanisms 
work in practice are set out below). 
            In addition to the benefits to the Exchequer of 
avoiding costly hearings, ADR may offer much to the parties. 
Hearings in whistleblowing cases may be unattractive to both 
employers and workers for a variety of reasons. For example, 
the former will want to avoid washing any dirty linen in 
public and the latter may believe that being visible as a 
                                                            
8
 See http://www.acas.org.uk/index.aspx?articleid=1680 
9
 Henceforward, where appropriate,I use the word “mediation” broadly so as 
to include “med/arb”. 
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whistleblower could inhibit their future job prospects.10 More 
positively, workers may have a better chance of achieving 
their objectives by open discussion or negotiation. Many 
whistleblowers are ethically driven and are determined to get 
an investigation of their concerns and ensure that any proven 
wrongdoing is rectified. These outcomes are unlikely to be 
achievable via tribunal adjudication but might form the basis 
of an amicable settlement. In addition, re-employment is 
almost never awarded by tribunals so it could hardly be less 
likely to emerge from ADR! 11  
EARLY DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN WHISTLEBLOWING CASES 
                  One objective of Government policy on 
employment relations is the early resolution of disputes 
because this provides tangible benefits “not only in terms of 
financial savings through the avoidance of formal procedures, 
and potentially an ET claim, but also in terms of continued 
productivity, enhanced morale and employee engagement.”12  
Delays increase the likelihood of positions becoming 
entrenched and this may harm both public and private interests 
if an employer has failed to respond adequately to a 
disclosure of information about alleged serious wrongdoing. 
                                                            
10
 Some would argue that, while private settlements may suit the parties, 
the public interest may not be served by concealing the fact that serious 
wrongdoing has occurred.  
11
 Reinstatement or reengagement was awarded in only five cases according 
to the statistics for April 2011 –March 2012 published by the ET and EAT 
Statistics. Ministry of Justice. 2012. Table 3 
12
 See Resolving Workplace Disputes: A consultation. January 2011. BIS and 
Tribunals Service. page 18. Available at www.bis.gov.uk. 
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Generally speaking, it might be expected that the early 
resolution of disputes will be promoted if employers have 
skilled human resource and line managers available as well as 
effective union representatives at the workplace.13 Arguably, 
speedy intervention is particularly important in 
whistleblowing situations where a prompt investigation could 
either reassure the person raising the concern that there is 
nothing wrong or lead to swift rectification if there is a 
problem. Empirical research suggests that many employers have 
whistleblowing procedures 14 but less information is available 
about the extent to which these provide for the internal 
resolution of disputes.15 
               In his 2007 review, Gibbons identified a number 
of factors which inhibited early dispute resolution.16 In 
addition to the point that the parties frequently do not fully 
appreciate the time, cost and stress involved in bringing or 
                                                            
13
 Gibbons suggested that employers’ organisations should “promote early 
resolution as a management tool and provide advice, guidance and training 
to empower managers to resolve disputes in the workplace” . Better Dispute 
Resolution: A review of employment dispute resolution in Great Britain. 
Michael Gibbons. March 2007. Department of Trade and Industry page 30.  
14
 See Lewis, D.  ‘The contents of whistleblowing/confidential reporting 
procedures in the UK: some lessons from empirical research’. (2006)  
Employee Relations, 28: 1, 76 – 86; Lewis, D. & Kender, M. ‘A Survey of  
Whistleblowing /Confidential Reporting Procedures in the Top 250 FTSE  
Firms’. SAI Global. 2010. 
15
  It is interesting that the PAS Code of Practice 2008 (note 4 above)does 
not appear to deal with dispute resolution. 
16
 See Better Dispute Resolution: A review of employment dispute resolution 
in Great Britain. Michael Gibbons. March 2007. Department of Trade and 
Industry page 34.  
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defending a claim,17 an argument that is particularly relevant 
in whistleblowing cases is that a determination of legal 
rights alone may not be sufficient. For example, in addition 
to judicial vindication, the worker may be seeking an 
acknowledgement by the employer that wrongdoing was taking 
place and that steps should be taken to deal with it. In such 
circumstances, even if a claim for compensation succeeds the 
worker may feel that the tribunal process has not provided a 
satisfactory solution. It may well be that if whistleblowers 
get good advice about which dispute resolution mechanism is 
most likely to deliver their desired outcome, many actual and 
potential claimants will prefer ADR instead of fighting their 
case at tribunal.    
          Before assessing the merits of tribunal adjudication 
it is worth noting two general criticisms of ADR - that, by 
virtue of its private and confidential nature, it lacks 
accountability and is non-normative i.e. other organizations 
cannot learn from its outcomes. By way of contrast, Sturm and 
Gadlin argue that, through the the linkage of individual and 
systemic conflict resolution: “ADR can play a significant role 
in developing legitimate and effective solutions to common 
                                                            
17
 A literature review for BIS noted the differences between perceived 
chances of success and actual ET outcomes. See Lucy,D and Broughton,A: 
Understanding the behaviour and decision-making of employees in conflicts 
and disputes at work. 2011. Available at www.bis.gov.uk. 
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problems and, in the process, produce generalisable norms”.18 
Accountability and the promotion of norms are clearly 
desirable yet what is crucial in whistleblowing cases is that 
there are public and/or private dispute resolution mechanisms 
available which reassure workers that their disclosures about 
wrongdoing and allegations of retaliation will be taken 
seriously.  
TRIBUNAL ADJUDICATION 
               It is well known among industrial relations 
specialists that, in advocating the creation of labour 
tribunals, the Donovan Royal Commission aimed to make 
available a procedure which is “easily accessible, informal, 
speedy and inexpensive”. 19 What are less frequently recalled 
are the words which followed immediately afterwards: “and 
which gives …. (employers and employees) the best possible 
opportunities of arriving at an amicable settlement of their 
differences”. Indeed, the Commission went on to state that 
bringing about such a settlement should be “a primary duty of 
the tribunal” and that “each hearing should be preceded by a 
‘round table’ meeting in private between the parties and the 
tribunal, or one or two of its members , in order to settle 
                                                            
18
 See Sturm,S and Gadlin,H  “Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change” 
(2007)Journal of Dispute Resolution 1-63. 
19
 Report of the Royal Commssion on Trade Unions and Employers’ 
Associations. HMSO. 1968. Cmnd 3623 page 156. 
9 
 
the case”.20  We return later to the issue of judicial 
mediation but will now describe how the tribunal system works 
in whistleblowing cases.  
            In the most recent four years for which statistics 
are available (2008-12), 8461 applications were lodged under 
Part IVA ERA 1996.21 43.7% of the cases disposed of during this 
period were through an ACAS conciliated settled; 31.2 were 
withdrawn or settled privately; 5.9% were successful and 11.6 
% were unsuccessful at a hearing.22  Information is not made 
public about the nature of ACAS settlements or the cases that 
are withdrawn or settled privately. Thus a whole range of 
outcomes is possible - from the worker simply dropping the 
case to the employer conceding that a detriment/dismissal has 
occurred, agreeing to rectify the wrongdoing, compensate the 
worker and stop treating him/her unfavourably for making the 
disclosure.23   
                It is unsurprising that such a small 
proportion of whistleblowing cases reach a tribunal hearing. 
In addition to the general problems of costs, fees, 
                                                            
20
 Ibid page 159 
21
 Whether one regards the number of whistleblowing claims as high or low, 
it should be noted that successive Governments have failed to publicise 
both the existence and implications of the protected disclosure provisions. 
22
 This information is from the Employment Tribunal Service and the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). 
23
 In the latest survey of ET applicants, it was found that 93% of cases 
that were settled involved some kind of payment. Claimants withdrew their 
cases were for a variety of reasons but 19% did so because it was too 
expensive to continue. See Peters, M. et al: Findings from the survey of 
employment tribunal applications 2008. Employment Relations Research Series 
107.London, BIS.(2010)  
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representation, delay,fear, stress 24 and inadequate remedies 
that face all claimants (which are discussed further below), 
whistleblowers have to overcome a number of statutory hurdles 
if a disclosure is to be protected under Part IVA ERA 1996. 
Indeed, it seems reasonable to suggest that some cases will be 
settled or withdrawn because the worker realizes that 
continuing might be legally hazardous and costly in both 
financial and non-financial terms. Not only will there be the 
potential problem of demonstrating “public interest” 25 but the 
good faith requirement for a qualifying disclosure has been in 
place since the legislation came into force in 1999.26 In 
addition, case law has demonstrated that there are other 
uncertainties, for example, about the meaning of “substantial 
truth”,27 the difference between a disclosure and an allegation 
28
 and the need to prove causation of harm.29  
              It is important to note that, although it is 
often difficult to obtain an appropriate remedy in other 
tribunal jurisdictions, whistleblowing cases have distinctive 
                                                            
24 In the latest survey of ET applicants, 36% of claimants stated that the 
case had caused them stress and depression. See Peters, M et al: Findings 
from the survey of employment tribunal applications 2008. Employment 
Relations Research Series 107. London, BIS.(2010)   
25
 It almost goes without saying that internal whistleblowing policies and 
procedures do not have to include a public interest test. Indeed, such 
arrangements are put in place to serve the private interests of the 
employer and worker. 
26
 See Street v Derbyshire Unemployed Worker Centre [2004]IRLR 687 
27
 See Korashi v Abertawe University Health Board [2012] IRLR 4 
28
 See Cavendish Munro Ltd v Geduld [2010] IRLR 38 
29
 See Fecitt v NHS Manchester [2012] IRLR 64 
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features. Most claimants will have chosen to disclose 30 and, 
by definition, will have suffered a detriment for putting 
their head above the parapet in an attempt to get perceived 
wrongdoing rectified. Tribunal adjudication does not enable 
workers to achieve this objective because there is currently 
no power to order an investigation. Tribunal documentation can 
be referred, with the worker’s consent, to appropriate 
prescribed persons (regulators)31  but this provides no 
guarantee that action will be taken. Even though 
whistleblowing claims are often treated as a form of 
discrimination,32 tribunals who find in favour of the 
complainant lack the power to make a recommendation that is 
contained in the Section 124 of the Equality Act 2010. Thus 
the fundamental problem with tribunal hearings is that they 
are highly unlikely to satisfy a whistleblower’s desire for 
his or her concerns to be examined because that is simply not 
the purpose of the adjudication. Nevertheless, the 
deliberations and outcome of a hearing could serve the public 
interest by disseminating best practice in a way that is not 
so directly achievable through private dispute resolution 
mechanisms. 
                                                            
30
 Although some will have had a contractual,fiduciary or statutory 
obligation to do so. Statutory duties are imposed in relation to money 
laundering, terrorism as well as health and safety. See,for example, 
Regulation 14 of the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regs 1999 SI 
No 3242   
31
 The Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2010. S.I No. 131. Regulation 2  
32
 See Virgo Fidelis School v Boyle [2004] IRLR 268 
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                Having discussed some special characteristics 
of whistleblowing cases, it is appropriate to briefly discuss 
some general problems faced by actual and potential tribunal 
claimants. In 2011 the Department for Business Innovation and 
Skills (BIS) estimated that the average cost of an ET hearing 
to an employer was £4200, to a claimant £1500 and to the 
Exchequer £4450.33 In relation to representation, the most 
recent survey of tribunal applicants revealed 46% of claimants 
34
 and 60% of employers had a representative  to “help with 
their case on a day- to- day basis.” At a full hearing, 34% of 
claimants were represented and 73% of employers. 35 Of those 
who received advice and representation, the mean amount paid 
for professional services was £4123 for claimants and £8009 
for employers. The latest SETA survey reveals that 18% of 
those who settled privately and 25% of those who were involved 
in an ACAS settlement indicated that “the risk of having pay 
to pay costs had made them more likely to do so.” Of the 
claimants who withdrew, 37% stated that this risk had 
influenced their decision. 
           By way of contrast, the average cost of individual 
conciliation to an employer was £3300, to a claimant £1100 and 
                                                            
33
 BIS Resolving Workplace Disputes: Final Impact Assessment. November 
2011. Available at www.bis.gov.uk. Legal aid is unavailable for tribunal 
hearings.  
34
 This figure is 9% lower than in the 2003 survey.  
35
 See Peters,M et al: Findings from the survey of employment tribunal 
applications 2008. Employment Relations Research Series 107. London, BIS. 
(2010)  
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to the Exchequer £640.36 Thus, although conciliation is cheaper 
than a hearing for both parties, the biggest saving is made by 
the Exchequer. Although the cost of tribunal hearings has been 
the main driver for recent proposals for reform, 37  it is 
argued here that ADR may be attractive to whistleblowers for 
other reasons. Indeed, to the extent that one aim of tribunal 
reform is to refocus the dispute resolution process on dealing 
with the issues raised,38 it is important to remember that the 
problem raised by whistleblowers is that wrongdoing may be 
occurring that needs to be investigated. In addition to the 
‘normal’ fear and personal distress that results from invoking 
the tribunal system, whistleblowers may experience serious 
anxiety about whether or not the alleged wrongdoing will ever 
be investigated or dealt with. Given this extra dimension, it 
might be sensible to acknowledge that not all ET claims can be 
most effectively processed in the same way and that dispute 
resolution processes which address both the perceptions and 
actions of the parties may be particularly important in 
whistleblowing cases. It is not being asserted that 
discrimination or other issues are less amenable to non-
                                                            
36
 BIS Resolving Workplace Disputes: Final Impact Assessment . November 
2011.Available at www.bis.gov.uk 
37
 See Resolving Workplace Disputes: A consultation. January 2011. BIS and 
Tribunals Service. Available at www.bis.gov.uk. It goes without saying that 
no figures can be given to reflect non-financial costs e.g. emotional ones. 
38
 See Better Dispute Resolution: A review of employment dispute resolution 
in Great Britain. Michael Gibbons. March 2007. Department of Trade and 
Industry. 
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adversarial techniques 39. However,in prioritizing resources 
the number of anticipated cases might be borne in mind as well 
as the fact that there is a direct public interest in 
encouraging whistleblowers to report serious wrongdoing.  
ARBITRATION  
           Arbitration enables the parties to select an 
independent person to adjudicate in their dispute. Although 
there is no long history of Governments promoting arbitration 
as a means to resolve individual disputes, employers in both 
the public and private sector use it as the final stage of an 
internal procedure. Until relatively recently employees have 
been unable to waive their right to bring statutory claims. 
However, ACAS arbitration is now available as an alternative 
to a tribunal hearing in both unfair dismissal 40 and flexible 
working cases claims.41 The unfair dismissal scheme commenced 
in 2001 and the panel of arbitrators consists of people with 
knowledge and experience of workplace discipline. The 
arbitration is voluntary but the parties are obliged to waive 
their right to go to an ET by entering into conciliated 
                                                            
39
  Indeed,a CIPD report suggests that mediation may have its biggest 
impact in the areas of discrimination, bullying and harassment. See:  
CIPD.Workplace Mediation: How employers do it. CIPD, London.2008. 
40
  The ACAS Arbitration Scheme (Great Britain) Order 2004. S.I. 2004/753. 
Up to 2011, only 64 cases have been disposed of in this way.  
41
  The ACAS (Flexible Working) Arbitration (Great Britain) Scheme (Great 
Britain) Order 2004. S.I. 2004/233. At the time of writing there have been 
only 3 cases under this scheme. 
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settlements or compromise agreements.42 The procedure is 
intended to be more informal than ET’s but the arbitration 
focuses solely on the issue of whether or not the dismissal 
was fair. Awards are confidential to the parties and cannot 
normally be appealed.      
          Perhaps the main attraction of arbitration in 
whistleblowing cases is that it is conducted in private. This  
may encourage employers to allow an investigation of the 
wrongdoing alleged rather just the detriment suffered by the 
claimant. However, the current unfair dismissal scheme does 
not allow arbitrators to make broad recommendations and cases 
where action short of dismissal is complained about fall 
outside their remit. One potential disadvantage of arbitration 
generally as a form of dispute resolution is that those who 
opt for it voluntarily relinquish their legal rights. In this 
respect it compares unfavourably with mediation, which might 
allow for adjudication (subject to time limits in launching 
proceedings) if a settlement is not reached.  
CONCILIATION 
            The Employment Tribunal Service sends ET claims 
and associated documentation to ACAS. Under Section 18 of the 
Employment Tribunals Act 1996 (ETA 1996) a conciliation 
                                                            
42
 See para 26 of the Schedule of the unfair dismissal Scheme (note 37 
above). Compromise agreements will be known as ‘settlement agreements’when 
Section 17 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill 2012 comes into 
force.  
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officer must, if requested to do so by either party or the 
officer considers that there is a reasonable prospect of 
success, endeavour to promote a settlement.43 It is important 
to remember that the purpose of conciliation is not to ensure 
that a settlement is fair or reasonable but “that the parties 
are reaching unforced agreements.” 44 Thus it is perfectly 
possible that a settlement will be achieved of a 
whistleblowing claim that does not lead to either the 
investigation of wrongdoing or its rectification.45 If this is 
the case, it might be contended that ‘privatised justice’ is 
less acceptable in whistleblowing than other types of dispute. 
On the other hand it might be argued that it is less important 
that justice is seen to be done than that potential 
whistleblowers are confident that appropriate dispute 
resolution mechanisms are available if they run into trouble. 
            Historically, ACAS’ duty to offer conciliation 46 
has related both to ‘post-claim ‘(those that have already been 
made to an ET) and ‘pre-claim’ complaints (where requested by 
at least one party to a dispute that has not yet been referred 
to an ET). Because ‘post –claim’ cases are easier to handle 
                                                            
43
 Although it is ACAS policy not to advise the parties, the latest SETA 
survey revealed that 65% of claimants and 66% of employer thought 
conciliation officers “were good at helping them to consider the pros and 
cons of settling their case without going to a full tribunal hearing.” See 
Peters, M et al: Findings from the survey of employment tribunal 
applications 2008. Employment Relations Research Series 107. London, BIS. 
(2010) page xxiv. 
44
 Dickens, L. Making employment rights effective. Oxford, Hart. 2012 page 
38 
45
 On the need to strive for justice rather than peace see : Fiss, O. “On 
settlement”. (1984)  Yale Law Journal  Vol. 93(6) 1073-90  
46
 This service is confidential, free, impartial and voluntary.  
17 
 
and, if settled, tribunal costs are more obviously saved, most 
of ACAS’ conciliation resources have been allocated to them. 
Indeed, performance targets encourage this body to focus on 
claims that are likely to take the most time at tribunal. 47                  
In 2009, ACAS began offering pre-claim conciliation to callers 
to its Helpline48 and the evaluation evidence 49 led the 
Government to conclude that such a service could reduce the 
number of claims going to ET’s significantly. Part 2 of the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill 2012 deals with 
conciliation before the institution of tribunal proceedings. 50 
According to the new Section 18A of the ETA 1996, before such 
proceedings can be commenced a claimant must normally provide 
ACAS with “prescribed information, in the prescribed manner” 
and conciliation officers must “endeavour to promote a 
settlement” during a prescribed period. If the officer 
concludes that a settlement is impossible or one is not 
achieved during the prescribed period a certificate will be 
                                                            
47
  The ACAS Annual Reports record the number of potential hearing days 
saved as a result of individual conciliation. 
48
 According to one study, 23% of callers to the Helpline who were 
considering an ET claim decided it against it as a result of this contact. 
See: Davey, B and Dix,G. The Dispute Resolution Regulations Two Years On: 
the ACAS experience. Research Paper 07/’11. London; ACAS. 2011.  
49
 Evaluation of the first year of ACAS’Pre-Claim Conciliation Service. 
ACAS. 2010. http://www.acas.org.uk/ 
50
 It is estimated that this will result in a reduction of about 12,000 ET 
claims.See Resolving Workplace Disputes: A consultation. January 2011. BIS 
and Tribunals Service.page 22. Available at www.bis.gov.uk. A cynic might 
suggest that Governments tend to be more interested in cost savings to the 
Exchequer than that the parties to disputes are satisfied. It is estimated 
that the net benefits to employers will be £32, 507,719,to the Exchequer 
£19,598,551 and to claimants £16,710,314. See BIS Resolving Workplace 
Disputes: Final Impact Assessment. November 2011.page 48. Available at 
www.bis.gov.uk 
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issued. Tribunal proceedings cannot be commenced without a 
certificate where one is required. 
           Since the new statutory provisions are not yet in 
force we can only speculate about their impact. However, given 
that the Government is planning to introduce an ET fee regime, 
it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that potential 
claimants will be keen to avail themselves of the free 
services being offered by a tried and trusted specialist 
agency. No doubt many claimants will make considerable efforts 
to resolve their disputes in order to avoid further stress and 
expense. Unfortunately, some Machiavellian employers may be 
tempted to resist early conciliation if they believe that the 
complainant is unwilling or unable to pay ET fees and the 
other costs that will be incurred if there is a hearing. 
 MEDIATION 
             In addition to questions about its effectiveness, 
there are many policy and practical issues raised by the use 
of mediation: ”the denial of formal justice to powerless 
groups, the risk of annexation to court processes and the 
ethics of mandatory participation and regulation of the 
field…..what works well in one situation may work less well in 
another”.51 The Gibbons Review concluded that mediation could 
                                                            
51
 Boon,A.et al [2011] ILJ 45, pages 46-7. See generally: Bingham,L. 
“Employment Dispute Resolution: The case for mediation”. (2004. Conflict 
Resolution Quarterly 145-174 
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be particularly effective in employment disputes because it 
enables the parties to discuss their issues openly and in 
confidence: “It is a pragmatic, flexible and informal way of 
providing both parties with positive outcomes”. This is 
especially important in whistleblowing cases where the 
claimant may be seeking remedies that an ET cannot deliver, 
for example, an apology or reference and a commitment to 
behave differently in the future. However, Gibbons did not 
suggest the introduction of either a mandatory 52 or near-
mandatory approach to ADR, largely because of the views 
expressed by employer and employee representatives and a worry 
about the potential costs. Nevertheless, it was recommended 
that appropriate mediation should be offered in “disputes 
likely to benefit from it” 53 and that a pilot study should be 
conducted. 54 
                In fact an evaluation of a pilot judicial 
mediation service offered by ET’s was commissioned by the 
Ministry of Justice in 2006 and, building on its perceived 
success, judicial mediation was made available for 
discrimination cases at English and Welsh ET regional offices 
                                                            
52
 On mandatory mediation in New Zealand see Corby,S. Resolving Employment 
Rights Through Mediation: The New Zealand Experience. Institute of 
Employment Rights, London. 1999. 
53
 The ability to interrupt the process to allow for further investigations 
may be particularly valuable in whistleblowing cases. 
54
 See Better Dispute Resolution: A review of employment dispute resolution 
in Great Britain. Michael Gibbons. March 2007. Department of Trade and 
Industry.page 41 
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from 2009.55 According to Boon et al, the quantitative results 
“found no discernible or statistically significant impact of 
early resolution attributable to judicial mediation”. 56 
However, there are some important features of the process that 
can only be assessed qualitatively. For example, the extent to 
which the parties have moved from their original positions, 
the fairness of the outcome and the extent of compliance with 
it, the state of employment relationships after the mediation 
and the general satisfaction of the parties with the process.        
                  In its 2011 consultation paper the 
Government was effusive about mediation and described the 
process as delivering “a ‘win-win’ outcome that benefits 
parties not only in terms of the direct savings from avoiding 
the tribunal route, but also in terms of preserving the 
employment relationship, maintaining productivity, reducing 
sickness absence and increasing employee engagement”.57 It 
referred to the costs of bringing a tribunal claim (see 
above)and the fact that many cases took at least 26 weeks to 
determine. By way of comparison, it pointed out that mediation 
could be completed in one day at a cost of about £1200 if the 
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  It is important to note that judicial mediation was provided here by 
employment judges. It is argued below that non-legal ET members could play 
a valuable role if mediation was promoted as a dispute resolution 
mechanism.   
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 Boon,A et al [2011] ILJ 45, pages 46-7. See also Urwin, P, Latreille, P 
and Karuk,V “Quantitative evidence in the evaluation of ADR: the case of 
judicial mediation in UK Employment Tribunals”.(2012)International Journal 
of Human Resource Management 567-589. 
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 See Resolving Workplace Disputes: A consultation. January 2011. BIS and 
Tribunals Service. page 21. Available at www.bis.gov.uk 
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problem is dealt with early.58 Significantly, there is nothing 
to prevent the parties reaching their own agreement on costs.59                   
              Given that mediation can be faster, cheaper and 
promote agreement between the parties, what evidence is there 
about its recent application to individual employment 
disputes? A 2008 CIPD survey of employers reported that fewer 
than half of respondents were in organizations that had used 
mediation. However,in a repeat survey in 2011 the equivalent 
figure was 57.3%. Whereas 47.9% of private organisations in 
the subsequent survey used mediation, 82% of public sector 
employers did so. 42.4% of respondents stated that they relied 
on internal mediation only and 18.6% used external mediation 
only. Interestingly, more use was made of employment 
consultants than other suppliers of mediation.60 According to 
the 2008 SETA survey, 23% of claimants reported that before 
they lodged an ET application someone had suggested that they 
should use mediation and 9% of claimants stated that they had 
done so. Perhaps more important is that, irrespective of 
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 In the most recent survey of ET applicants,9% of claimants and 7% of 
employers reported that mediation had been used. See Peters, M et al: 
Findings from the survey of employment tribunal applications 2008. 
Employment Relations Research Series 107. London, BIS. (2010)  
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 ET’s can only award costs if it is shown that ”the paying party has in 
bringing the proceedings, or he or his representative has in conducting the 
proceedings, acted vexatiously, abusively, disruptively or otherwise 
unreasonably, or the bringing or conducting of the proceedings by the 
paying party has been misconceived.”: Rule 40. Schedule 1. Employment 
Tribunal (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004. S.I. 1861. 
In 2011-12,costs were awarded to claimants in 116 cases and to respondents 
in 1295 cases. In his review of the ET Rules, Mr Justice Underhill noted 
that the current costs arrangements unfairly penalised parties who were not 
represented by a lawyer or who represented themselves. It is more likely to 
be workers who are affected by this. 
60
 CIPD.Conflict Management. Survey Report.CIPD, London.2011. 
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whether they had done so previously, 80% of claimants and 88% 
of employers said they would consider using mediation in a 
future dispute. More recent research reveals that 71% of 
participants were either very or fairly satisfied and that 88% 
of those who commissione mediation were satisfied with the 
ACAS Mediation service. Unsurprisingly, there was a strong 
link between participants overall satisfaction and whether the 
underlying issues had been resolved.61 
           As this article suggests that mediation may be 
particularly appropriate in whistleblowing cases, we need to 
discuss how it might operate in practice. There is no 
consensus about the precise ingredients of the process and it 
has been observed that the words conciliation and mediation 
are “interchangeable in many contexts”. 62 Indeed, Dickens 
asserts that the definition of conciliation in the Gibbons 
Report “could easily be exchanged with that given for 
mediation.” 63 Nevertheless, we will attempt to distinguish the 
main approaches to mediation.64 Facilitative mediation promotes 
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 ACAS Research and Evaluation Section. ACAS Individual Mediation 2011/12: 
Responses from participants and commissioners. Ref 16/12. ACAS.London. 
2012. 
62
 Dolder,C. [2004] ILJ 320, at 325 
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 Dickens, L. Making employment rights effective. Oxford, Hart. 2012. page 
38 
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 Neither transformative mediation nor early neutral evaluation will be 
referred to as separate models in this article. In theory, transformative 
mediation aims to encourage the parties to control the situation they find 
themselves in. Early neutral evaluation involves an impartial person with 
specialist knowledge and skills being invited to evaluate a case. Dolder 
(note 62) identifies facilitative mediation as lying between transformative 
and evaluative mediation (page 332). For further discussion about the 
possible forms of mediation see: Boulle, A and Nesic, M: Mediation: 
Principles, Process, Practice. London, Butterworths. 2001. 
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the parties’ communication and understanding but does not 
provide them with guidance or solutions. By way of contrast, 
evaluative (or problem –solving) mediation is more active in 
getting the parties to contemplate the possible outcomes of 
their dispute.65  In theory, the mediator controls the process 
and the parties determine the outcome. However, if the parties 
are pushed too firmly towards a settlement they may feel that 
they have lost control and experience the process as being 
more like arbitration. 
            It seems sensible to acknowledge that the 
facilitative and evaluative approaches often merge in 
practice. As Boon et al explain: “Mediators and mediation 
codes often have a rhetorical commitment to a purely 
facilitative model of mediation, while experienced mediators 
actually use evaluative techniques as circumstances demand”.66 
For example, in whistleblowing cases, the open questioning 
associated with facilitative mediation may be useful in 
determining whether or not there is a mutual interest in 
investigating and dealing with any wrongdoing. A more 
evaluative approach might be appropriate to get the parties to 
explore whether or not detrimental treatment has occurred. 
Thus, if the parties agree on some issues, for example that 
wrongdoing has occurred and that it will be rectified, they 
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 Traditionally, the role of collective mediation has been to direct the 
parties towards a resolution of their dispute. 
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 Boon,A. et al [2011] ILJ 45, at page 78 
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may consent to “med/arb” on the question of whether or not the 
whistleblower was victimized and what remedy might be  
appropriate. 
                 Whatever form mediation takes, it might be 
especially valuable to dismissed whistleblowers who are 
seeking re-employment. One possible reason why ET’s hardly 
ever recommend this remedy in any type of case is that they 
have no real evidence about its practicability.67 Mediation 
could be helpful in this respect as it might result in an 
employer taking measures that could secure a return to work. 
For example, in the light of the worker’s disclosures, the 
employer might be prepared to: review work practices, move the 
discloser away from any person about whom wrongdoing was 
alleged, and take steps to minimize the risk of the 
whistleblower suffering retaliation. Such action may make 
claimants more willing to return to work and, presumably, 
would only be taken if the employer was persuaded that a 
valuable relationship could be restored.  
             Mediation may also be appropriate in 
whistleblowing cases if the employer is anxious to avoid 
publicity but the worker is unwilling to settle without their 
allegations of wrongdoing being investigated. In addition to 
the cost of a hearing, mediation might save the claimant from 
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 Section 116 ERA 1996 spells out the need for practicability. 
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having to experience the stresses of the adversarial process 68 
and calling witnesses to a public hearing to give evidence 
that might damage their employment prospects. More positively, 
mediation provides opportunities for workers to vent their 
feelings as well as express their opinions and allows those 
they are in conflict with to understand and empathise with 
their actions. An opportunity for catharsis may be especially 
important in whistleblowing cases where the worker may have 
experienced shock and outrage at the employer’s negative 
reaction to the disclosure.69 
           The potential for creative solutions offered by 
mediation might also be valuable where a whistleblower’s 
allegations are shown to be unfounded. If they have been 
honestly made on reasonable grounds, it will be important that 
any resulting damage to the employment relationship is 
repaired. Indeed, if the whistleblower appears to have 
suffered by disclosing, others who subsequently acquire a 
reasonable belief about the occurrence of wrongdoing might be 
deterred from reporting it. This may not serve either the 
employer’s or the public interest. To the extent that 
mediation can promote the reconciliation of diverse interests 
it is to be welcomed. However, it should be acknowledged that 
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 Including cross-examination about his or her motives if the issue of 
good faith arises.  
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 On the experiences of whistleblowers generally see Alford, C. 
Whistleblowers: Broken Lives and Organisation Power. Cornell University 
Press,Ithaca. 2001. 
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unequal power relationships at the workplace may prevent this 
coming to fruition. Normally, employers can use their superior 
resources and bargaining power to ensure that their interests 
prevail. The effect of Section 43J ERA 1996 cannot be ignored 
in this context. This states that “any provision in an 
agreement to which the section applies is void in so far as it 
purports to preclude the worker from making a protected 
disclosure.”70  It is impossible to know how many 
whistleblowers realize that gagging clauses cannot be enforced 
and how many would agree to them anyway as part of a 
satisfactory settlement. One consequence of Section 43J ERA 
1996 may be that some employers will opt for an arbitrator’s 
decision rather than mediation because the former will be 
fully binding on both parties whereas all the provisions of a 
a settlement agreement may not be.  
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
              It has been observed that ADR should stand for 
“appropriate” rather than alternative dispute resolution and 
that the form of intervention should reflect “the nature of 
the dispute and the level of severity and entrenchment that 
the disagreement has reached”.71 This article has suggested 
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 According to Section 43J(2) ERA 1996: “This section applies to any 
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any proceedings for breach of contract”. 
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that adjudication in whistleblowing cases may not be the best 
method of serving either private or public interests. For 
example, workers might be aiming for understanding and 
reconciliation rather retribution and compensation.72  Thus 
mediation could be attractive to them because it can result in 
an apology. This may not be offered at an ET hearing because 
it could be construed as evidence of liability.73 Indeed, it is 
in an important feature of mediation that it has the potential 
to create an environment in which the parties can explicitly 
consider forgiveness. 
             On other hand the parties may have good or bad 
reasons for not wanting to engage in mediation. For example, 
although workers may feel that they can participate more in 
the process, they may also view mediators as authority figures 
who are favourably inclined towards an employer. Nevertheless, 
the cost of an ET hearing if mediation fails will put pressure 
on claimants to compromise. 74 Conversely, an employer may not 
want to get involved in mediation on the grounds that, if they 
refuse to do so, the matter may be dropped because the worker 
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 On the reputation of restorative justice and mediation for effectiveness 
in complex and emotional situations see: Roche, D. “Gluttons for 
restorative justice”. (2003) Economy and Society. Vol. 32. 630-644 
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of statutory duty.”  
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cannot afford to continue with their case. One way of exerting 
pressure on an organisation to take mediation seriously might 
be to give ACAS officers (in addition to ET’s) the power to 
refer documentation to prescribed persons.75 Thus conciliation 
officers might hint that a refusal to explore the issues 
raised via mediation might influence their decision about 
whether or not to send the paperwork to a regulator.          
More drastically, the parties’objections to mediation might be 
overcome by making it a compulsory part of the tribunal 
process in whistleblowing cases. Thus ACAS officers would be 
encouraged to hold face- to -face meetings with the parties 
instead of the current practice of making telephone contact. 
Where appropriate, employers might be referred to specialist 
advisors that could assist with longer term issues. For 
example, how to devise,implement and monitor effective 
whistleblowing policies and procedures.  
            Arguably mediation can succeed even if the parties 
do not initially enter the process willingly. What is crucial 
is that the mediator has the requisite skills to deal with the 
difficult aspects of whistleblowing disputes and can deploy 
the techniques that best suit the problems that arise. There 
is little point in recommending subsequent judicial mediation 
if it simply replicates the role of ACAS officers. However, if 
facilitative mediation proved unsuccessful,the parties might 
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still find more evaluative judicial mediation preferable to a 
tribunal hearing. In this context, I suggest that the term 
judicial mediation should include mediation by an employment 
judge, a non-legal member or both. Apart from increasing the 
number of personnel available, non-legal members are appointed 
on the basis of their employment experience and may be 
particularly attractive to the parties as co-mediators. 
               The most obvious criterion for determining the 
success of mediation is the rate of settlement but I would 
argue that there are other measures which are important in 
whistleblowing cases. Apart from speed and the reduction in 
cost, the number of issues resolved, the nature of agreements 
and their durability and the satisfaction of the parties are 
critical where wrongdoing has been disclosed and the worker 
has suffered for it. Currently ACAS mediation is voluntary but 
there is a cost to users. Given its particular relevance in 
whistleblowing cases, mediation could be made either mandatory 
or ‘near mandatory’. The former sounds draconian but there is 
still an element of voluntariness in that some participation 
in the process would be required but the parties could 
withdraw from it if and when they choose. What is envisaged in 
a‘near mandatory’system is that the parties would have to 
explain to ACAS and/or an employment judge why they thought 
mediation would not be productive. Although it would seem 
politically implausible at the moment, another possibility 
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would be to make mediation compulsory for employers but 
optional for workers.76 
           Recognising that mediation is likely to have the 
most beneficial impact if it is used at an early stage of a 
disagreement, it is envisaged that ACAS would offer both pre- 
and post –claim mediation. If ACAS or other mediation failed,77 
ACAS would then certify that fact. At this stage arbitration 
might become more attractive to the parties so it might be 
worth extending and adapting the ACAS Arbitration Scheme to 
whistleblowing cases.78 For example, the Scheme might be 
amended to allow arbitrators to make recommendations. If 
arbitration is not taken up, the case could proceed to an ET 
where judicial mediation might be offered as the final private 
and confidential step before a public hearing. 
            It is also suggested that in future mediation 
should be free in whistleblowing cases. A number of arguments 
can be made for this. First, such a service would clearly 
promote access to justice for workers and send a message to 
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 This was the position under the US REDRESS programme.  See: Ridley-Duff, 
R & Bennett, A “Towards mediation: developing a theoretical framework to 
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Journal.Vol.42. pages 106-123 
77
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Vol 25(4),555 -579 
78
 The requirement to waive the right to expose an employer to a public 
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employers that the Government understands the importance of 
resolving whistleblowing disputes constructively and amicably 
whenever possible. Second, since ACAS or privately -led 
mediation would be offered in the first instance, the cost 
should be less to the Exchequer than either judicial mediation 
or a tribunal hearing.79 Third, it has been argued above that 
whistleblowing cases have features that justify special 
treatment. Tribunal hearings focus on detriment and dismissal 
and cannot investigate or rectify proven wrongdoing. To the 
extent that mediation is better able to explore and deal with 
the underlying issues in a dispute it might save the public 
having to bear the cost of wrongdoing continuing.80 
            Undoubtedly the provision of free mediation would 
test the Government’s resolve both to encourage whistleblowing 
in the public interest. Recent research demonstrates that 
employers have made little use of mediation in the past and 
seem quite ignorant about it.81 Thus time and effort would be 
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required to communicate its aims and benefits to employers, 
workers and their representatives. People will need to be 
trained in how to use mediation effectively and employers must  
ensure that the mediators themselves provide a quality 
service.82 Equally, the trade union movement will need to be 
persuaded about the merits of the extended use of mediation. 
Although it is frequently suggested that mediation is most 
successful where no representatives are present, unions will 
need to sell the idea that it is not a replacement for 
representation. Indeed, union representatives may well be 
appropriate as supporters and advisers where a whistleblowing 
member is particularly fragile and asks to have an official 
present. Given that smaller organization might be particularly 
resistant to face –face-face mediation,83 it is recommended 
that there should be a trial to test the value of mediation in 
whistleblowing cases involving medium –sized and large 
organizations. 84 
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